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Lilly: The Right to an In Camera Voluntariness Hearing: State v. Sanders

CASE COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO AN IN CAMERA VOLUNTARINESS
HEARING: State v. Sanders
Under the early common law, all statements of guilt were
admissible as evidence regardless of the circumstances under
which they were secured.1 By the 1800's, however, the principle of
exclusion had developed and the West Virginia rule has always
been that a confession or inculpatory statement by a person accused of a crime is inadmissible in evidence if not freely and voluntarily made. 2 Therefore, when the prosecution wishes to introduce
a statement allegedly made by the defendant and amounting to an
admission of part or all of the offense with which he is charged, in
most circumstances a hearing must first be held out of the presence
of the jury to determine its voluntariness.3 The duty of the court
to hold an in camera hearing is mandatory, and failure to do so
constitutes reversible eiror.4
In the past, this requirement has been limited to situations
where the confession was made to police officers or other persons
in authority while the defendant was in custody or undergoing
interrogation.' This limitation is directly connected with the fac3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 817-20 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
2

The first West Virginia case stating this proposition is State v. Morgan, 35

W. Va. 260, 13 S.E. 385 (1891). The case notes that it is also a well-settled rule in
Virginia.
3 State v. Smith, 212 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1975); Spaulding v. Warden, 212
S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1975); State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
1 State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 579, 148 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1966).
Wilhelm v. Whyte, 239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1977); State v. Johnson, 226
S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a spontaneous statement made prior to any
police action or interrogation may be admitted into evidence without its voluntariness first having been determined in an in camera hearing. In Johnson,the defendant exclaimed, "I shot him, Gary," to a deputy sheriff called to the scene shortly
after the shooting. The court found that under the circumstances of this case-the
statement was made before there was any arrest, custodial supervision or police
interrogation of any kind, the defendant considered the particular deputy a friend,
and there was no objection to the introduction of the statement-the evidence
showed that the statement was spontaneous and the reasons for holding a hearing
to determine voluntariness did not apply. The court did find, however, that the trial
court committed reversible error by failing to conduct a voluntariness hearing with
respect to later statements made by the defendant; these statements were made
while the defendant was being driven to the hospital by another deputy sheriff, after
he had been advised of his rights); State v. Vance, 146 W. Va. 925, 124 S.E.2d 252
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tors that led to the formation of the rule. First, it became evident
that persons, through hope or fear, would confess to crimes which
had not been committed or had been committed by someone else.
Since the justification for permitting the admission of extrajudicial confessions is based upon the assumption that people will
not confess to crimes they did not commit, the requirement that
the statement be made voluntarily, without threats or inducement, developed to maintain the trustworthiness of the evidence
presented to the jury.'
Second, the use of an involuntary confession would be a violation of both the West Virginia Constitution and the United States
Constitution, which provide that a person in a criminal case shall
not be compelled to be a witness against himself.7 Since these
factors were of concern only where the confession was made to one
in authority, the rule until State v. Sanders8 has been that to
exclude a confession, it must not only be made under inducement
of favor or fear, but such inducement must come from one in
authority?
The court in State v. Sanders greatly expanded the right to
an in camera voluntariness hearing. It held that the primary purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the confession was
voluntary, rather than to deter, discover, or punish undesirable
police conduct; therefore, the right to such a hearing does not
depend upon the identity of the party to whom the admission is
made.10
The defendant in Sanders shot and killed her husband as he
entered their home. She was taken into custody by the police, who
took her to the West Virginia University Medical Center where she
(1962); State v. Brady, 104 W. Va. 523, 140 S.E. 546 (1927); State v. Morgan, 35

W. Va. 260, 13 S.E. 385 (1891) (holding that inculpatory statements uttered by the
defendant, apparently in her sleep and heard by another woman sleeping in the
same bed, need not be shown to be voluntary before being admitted into evidence;
but that a confession to a detective, made under promises of aid, was the proper
subject of a hearing by the court to determine its admissibility. Since the detective
was a private detective, not working in connection with the police, the inducement
did not come from one in authority, and therefore the trial court properly admitted
the confession into evidence).
State v. Fortner, 150 W. Va. 571, 578, 148 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1966).
W. VA. CONsT. art. TIT, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
a 242 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1978).
State v. Morgan, 35 W. Va. 260, 267, 13 S.E. 385, 387 (1891).
10 242 S.E.2d at 556-57.
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STATE v. SANDERS
was examined and treated." Shortly thereafter, a friend of the
defendant visited her in the hospital. During her visit, the defendant made some incriminating remarks." At the trial, the defendant, whose sole defense was insanity, requested an in camera
hearing to determine the voluntariness of her statements. The trial
court refused the motion, and the witness was permitted to relate
the conversation to the jury. The supreme court reversed, holding
that an in camera hearing is required regardless of the recipient's
identity.
The court's holding in Sanders appears to expand the requirement of an in camera hearing in other directions as well. The
recent holdings in State v. Johnson" and Wilhelm v. Whyte" appear to be implicitly overruled by the present case. In these decisions, the court held that a spontaneous statement to a police
officer, before any accusation, arrest or custodial interrogation has
been undertaken, may be admitted into evidence without first
holding an in camera hearing to determine its voluntariness. It
seems unlikely that in camera hearings would still not be required
for spontaneous statements to police officers when State v.
Sanders now requires hearings for spontaneous statements made
to personal friends.
Because of the contradictions between the court's treatment
of the spontaneous remarks in Sanders and in Johnson and
Wilhelm, it seems plausible that the court may limit Sanders in
the future, and not require an in camera voluntariness hearing for
every confession, regardless of the circumstances under which it
" The defendant was treated by four doctors whom she told she had tried to
commit suicide by swallowing twenty-five Valium tablets. The defendant was also
seen by the staff psychiatrist who diagnosed her as suicidally depressed and mentally ill.
"

Mrs. Hall's testimony was as follows:

She [the defendant] said that no one would forgive a murderer....
She went on to say that she had had twenty-five years of unhappiness ....
She said that she had been thinking about this for some
She said that he treated me like a dog at times.
tim'e ....
242 S.E.2d at 556 n.2.
'3 226 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976) (discussed in note 5, supra).
" 239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1977) (The petitioner made several brief inculpatory
statements to neighbors at the scene of the crime to the effect that he was responsible for the murder. He made the same type of remark to one of the deputy sheriffs

as the deputy entered the mobile home, but before any arrest had been made or
questions asked. The court found nothing in the record to demonstrate that the
petitioner was under any threat or coercion when he made the statements, and
followed the rule set forth in Johnson).
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was made. In Sanders, the defendant alleged insanity as her sole
defense to the shooting. This insanity defense at least raises the
question whether the court was really concerned that a hearing be
held to determine if her confession was voluntary, or that a prior
determination be made under the facts of this case as to the
trustworthinessof the confession and therefore, its admissibility as
an exception to the hearsay rule.
An indication of the court's real concern in this case and the
direction it will take in the future might be gained from an analysis
of the authority the court cites to support its holding. In the North
Carolina decision of State v. Cooper," the defendant, while undergoing treatment in a hospital emergency room, confessed to
killing his wife and four of their five children.'" The trial court
conducted a lengthy voir dire in the absence of the jury and concluded that the defendant's statements to a nurse and medical
attendant were admissible into evidence." In discussing whether
the trial court had erred in admitting the statements, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that Miranda v. Arizona" was inapplicable since the defendant was not in custody or under police
interrogation at the time the confessions were made. Nevertheless, the court said, "to be admissible in evidence against him, the
confessions of the defendant to the hospital attendants must have
been made voluntarily and understandingly."'"
The court initially defines "understandingly" from the
perspective of the defendant: for the confession to have been made
15286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975).

,6The defendant was not under arrest at the time he was receiving medical
attention, nor had the murders yet been discovered. A police sergeant had noticed
the defendant in the locker room of a bowling alley, apparently nervous and wearing
a house slipper on one foot and a laced boot on the other; he took the defendant to
the hospital for observation. Id. at 554-55, 213 S.E.2d at 310.

27 The nurse recounted the following conversation with the defendant. First,
the defendant asked her to call the police, telling her that something awful was
wrongat his house. She asked him what he meant and he said he had destroyed
his wife and children. She asked him how and he said he had beaten them. He told
her:
I was walking around like a normal man listening to the radio. Then I
started dancing around like a wild man. I destroyed my family. The
music gave me sensations which told me my family was people from the
moon to kill me. I don't know why I did it. I don't understand.
Id. at 556-57, 213 S.E.2d at 311.
,5384 U.S. 436 (1966).
, 286 N.C. at 567, 213 S.E.2d at 317.
2o Id.
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understandingly, the court says, the defendant must have had the
requisite mental capacity. In defining this requisite mental capacity, however, the court appeared more concerned with the trustworthiness of the statements. The requirement of the requisite
mental capacity to confess is satisified if the accused is found to
have sufficient mental capacity to testify. The test for this capacity to testify is the ability "to understand and to relate. . . a fact
which will assist the jury in determining the truth with respect to
the ultimate facts at issue.

21

The court in Cooper found that the

defendant was capable of giving a correct account of the events
relating to the deaths of his wife and children, and had made the
statements confessing the murders freely, voluntarily, and understandingly.
In Cooper, as in Sanders, the defendant's state of mind was
in issue. The reference to the North Carolina case by the West
Virginia court supports the proposition that the court may be more
concerned with the trustworthiness of the confession than with how
freely it was made.
In another recent case, State v. Hamrick,2 the court expressed
the need for caution in admitting into evidence the confession of a
defendant who lacked the mental capacity to understand the possible consequences of confessing or waiving other rights. Although
the court was dealing with statements obtained during a police
interrogation, and was primarily concerned that the rights set forth
in Miranda v. Arizona be effectively extended to all defendants,
Hamrick may give some insight into the direction the court is
moving in Sanders. The court may be trying to assure that the
confessions introduced into evidence before the jury are reliable by
requiring an in camerahearing in situations where the defendant's
mental capacity is suspect, rather than expanding this requirement to all confessions regardless of their circumstances.
Ellen CarleLilly
21
22

Id.
236 S.E.2d 247 (W. Va. 1977).
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